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individual testing is impractical. 5 In view of the difficulty of proving that
no 36 year old could be a competent policeman,5 4 the Tamiami test vir-
tually forces Moundsville to consider administering separate tests to each
applicant for their police department.
The congressional purpose behind ADEA was to enable each worker to
demonstrate his own ability rather than face blanket exclusion from em-
ployment because of his age. The minimal increase test of a bfoq might
have made state age restrictions in police hiring virtually unassailable,
frustrating ADEA's intent.57 Requiring states to administer individual test-
ing if feasible forces the states to observe congressional policy. Tamiami
imposes congressional strictures on state hiring, and to that extent the
Arritt decision has diminished state autonomy in the interest of promoting
national antidiscrimination policy. 8
JOHN B. YELLOTT, JR.
VI. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Retroactivity Under the UCC
The states' individual adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) standardized commercial law in the United States.' As demon-
567 F.2d at 1271.
Proving that all the individuals in an age group are unqualified would require the
employer to prove a negative, and would not be possible under any standardized empirical
survey. See Age Discrimination, supra note 25 at 407.
" See, e.g., Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 463 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (individual testing
as an alternative to invoking bfoq). But see note 56 infra.
58 Department of Labor Bulletin, note 41 supra, (pointing out that differentiation based
on individual exams is permissably within the congressional intent but that classification by
age alone is not.) 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(ii) (1978); see ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976)
(Congressional purpose to promote employment of workers based on ability rather than age).
See also Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (purpose of
Congress is to promote individual testing). Experts disagree on whether medical tests can
accurately determine functional age or disabilities due to aging. Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976), accord Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 499
F.2d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561,
564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) (medical testing can accurately guage abilities
of aging test pilots). See generally Comment, Age Discrimination In Employment - The Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification Defense - Balancing The Interest Of The Older Worker In
Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against The Interest In Public Safety 24 WAYNE L.
REv. 1339, 1350 & 1358 (1978).
5 See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
5' If the Fourth Circuit test of a bfoq promulgated in Arritt is applied with circumspec-
tion, particularly with a view toward the economic realities of small rural police departments
and volunteer fire departments, the economic burden of separate testing should not prove
insufferable. Written exams and personal interviews conducted before the more expensive
physical or mental examinations, for instance, would reduce the pool of applicants requiring
the more expensive medical examinations.
I Every state except Louisiana has enacted the UCC. Although a number of amendments
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strated by the Fourth Circuit decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,2 however, the Code's draftsmen failed to antici-
pate all conflicts regarding the Code's application to pre-Code transac-
tions. The Florida legislature specified that the UCC was to apply to all
transactions entered into after the January 1, 1967 effective date of the
Code 3 and that all prior transactions were to be governed in accordance
with pre-Code law.' One of the areas of pre-Code law changed by Florida's
adoption of Article 2 of the UCC was the law of excuse for failure to perform
a contract.' The commercial impracticability standard embodied in sec-
tion 672.615 (Fla. Stat.)6 significantly relaxed Florida's common law ex-
cuse requirement.7 Westinghouse involved the applicability of section
were added to the Code by some states, commercial law under the UCC has become fairly
consistent across the states. D. LLOYD, UNDERSTANDING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-3
(1973). The UCC, and in particular § 2-615(FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.615 (West 1966)) (excusing
a seller who is unable to perform the contract due to the failure of presupposed conditions),
was designed to infuse good practical sense and fair dealing into commercial transactions.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Corp., 579 F.2d
856 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief of Appellant]; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.615,
Official Comment 6 (West 1966).
2 579 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1978).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.101(1) (West 1966) (renumbered from 680.10-101, see ch. 680,
art. 10, FLA. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 1979)) provides that, "this code shall become effective
at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1967. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring
after that date."
The Florida legislature adopted the following specific transition language pertaining to
pre-Code transactions:
Transactions validly entered into before the effective date specified in this section
and the rights, duties and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and
may be terminated, completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted
by any statute or other law amended or repealed by this code as though such repeal
or amendment had not occurred.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.101(2) (West 1966). This section corresponds to § 10-102(2) of the UCC.
'See notes 6-7 infra.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.615 (West 1966). The UCC did not codify precisely Florida's
common law of excuse. Section 672.615 excuses a seller's nonperformance if the performance
became impracticable by the failure of some presupposed condition essential to performance.
7 Brief of Appellee at 30, Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Corp., 579 F.2d
856 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellee]. Florida's common law of excuse
was expounded in City of Tampa v. City of Port Tampa, 127 So.2d 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961), in which Port Tampa sold and transferred its water system to Tampa under the express
agreement that Tampa would extend water mains, laterals and pipes to Port Tampa when-
ever necessary and without charge. Id. at 119-20. The court prohibited Tampa's later attempt
to charge for the extensions on the basis that no provisions for such charges had been incorpo-
rated in the contract. Id. at 121. The court stated that "regardless of the fact that the years
have proven this contract to be inadequate, this alone does not justify the court to modify
the contract." Id. at 120; see Moon v. Wilson, 100 Fla. 791, 130 So. 25, 27, (1930) (negligence
or want of skill, judgment or diligence on part of promisor precludes excuse of performance);
Enid Corp. v. Mills, 101 So.2d 906, 908-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (only act of God
rendering performance impossible excuses nonperformance). Under pre-Code common law,
Florida courts would not alter a contract to relieve one of the parties from the hardship of an
"improvident bargain." Beach Resort Hotel Corp. v. Wieder, 79 So.2d 659, 663 (Fla. 1955);
accord, Medard v. Paulson, 37 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1948); Pierce v. Isaac, 134 Fla. 666, 184
So. 509, 513 (Fla. 1938). Under section 672.615, however, a promisor is excused merely if
1979]
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672.615 to a 1965 contract between the plaintiff (FPL) and Westinghouse
to supply uranium to FPL's nuclear power plant.8
Under the terms of the 1965 contract, Westinghouse agreed to furnish
fuel to the Turkey Point 3 nuclear power plant according to one of three
arrangements chosen by FPL,9 beginning when the plant became opera-
tional. FPL selected its arrangement in 1972, seven years after the original
contract was signed and five years after Florida adopted Article 2. In the
1965 contract, Westinghouse also included an option, exercisable until
July, 1967, for FPL to purchase fuel for a second nuclear plant, Turkey
Point 4. FPL exercised this option in February, 1967, one month after the
effective date of the Florida UCC.'0
Westinghouse notified FPL in 1975 that performance of the Turkey
Point 3 and Turkey Point 4 fuel contracts had become commercially im-
practicable" and that Westinghouse thus considered itself excused from
performance under applicable Florida law.'" FPL refused the Westinghouse
performance becomes "impracticable" by the failure of a previously assumed condition, a less
strict rule than existed at common law. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.615 (West 1966).
, 579 F.2d at 857. The FPL suit was one of fourteen separate actions brought against
Westinghouse for its refusal to honor long-term fixed price contracts to deliver 70 million
pounds of uranium. Westinghouse claimed that an unforeseen rise in the price of uranium
made fulfillment of the contracts commercially impracticable, since its potential losses, if
forced to perform, were estimated at approximately two billion dollars. See Joskow,
Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 119, 119 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Joskow]. The actions against Westinghouse were
brought in thirteen different federal district courts. Since the actions involved common ques-
tions of fact, Westinghouse moved to transfer all actions to the Western district of Pennsyl-
vania for pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Con. Lit., 405 F. Supp. 316, 317 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). The judicial panel deter-
mined that transfer of the actions to the Eastern District of Virginia would best suit the
parties and witnesses and promote the most efficient conduct of the litigation. The transfer
under § 1407 was effected to prevent duplication of discovery, eliminate the possibility of
inconsistent pretrial rulings, and avoid conflicting preliminary injunctive demands on West-
inghouse. Id. at 318-19.
579 F.2d at 857-58. Under the contract, FPL had to choose one of three plans for
purchasing the fuel. The three options were to purchase a five year supply of fuel for a lump
sum with options on replacement fuel, or to purchase on a long term basis at a lump-sum
price on the first core or to purchase fuel on a long-term mills-per-kwh basis. Id. n.2.
Id. at 858.
" Id. The general policy followed by Westinghouse in the 1960's was to purchase uranium
in excess of its supply obligations. Shortly after executing the contract with FPL, Westing-
house bought a quantity of uranium substantially exceeding its obligations to FPL. In the
1970's, however, Westinghouse began to sell uranium without replenishing its supply. By
1974, Westinghouse had sold far more uranium than it had acquired. Brief of Appellee, supra
note 7, at 6. Westinghouse contends that events so affecting the uranium market as to render
completion of the contracts impracticable included: a conspiracy by uranium producers to
raise uranium prices, allocate supplies and boycott Westinghouse; the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo
and the OPEC cartel creating an energy crisis affecting all fuel; pressures on the uranium
supplies by the Atomic Energy Commission's contracting policies; delays in uranium repro-
cessing in addition to the "breeder" reactor which intensified uranium demand; and restric-
tions on exports by uranium producing countries, all of which disrupted the supply and
demand in the uranium market. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14.
12 579 F.2d at 858; see note 6 supra.
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offer to allocate the remaining uranium among FPL and its other custom-
ers. Upon Westinghouse's failure to perform the contract as agreed, FPL
sought specific performance of the contract or damages for its breach'3 and
moved to strike Westinghouse's affirmative defense of commercial imprac-
ticability." In granting the motion, the district court ruled that Westing-
house could not claim the benefit of a statute enacted after the contract
was formed.'5 The Fourth Circuit granted Westinghouse an interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).' 6
Westinghouse based its commercial impracticability defense on
changes in the uranium market which drove the cost of completing the
contracts so high as to render their performance financially prohibitive.
Among the factors responsible for the drastic, changes were an alleged
conspiracy by uranium producers to raise prices, the 1973 Arab Oil Em-
bargo, demands on the uranium market by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, and restrictions placed on exports by uranium producing countries.'7
Although the UCC became effective in Florida after the Turkey Point 3
contract was signed, Westinghouse reasoned that when a pre-Code con-
tract called for significant "events occurring after" the effective date of the
Code, the Code would apply to those "events." Westinghouse based its
argument on the Code's transition clause which specifically states that the
Code "applies to transactions entered into- and events occurring after"
January 1, 1967.18 Included in these "events" were FPL's choice of fuel
service options in 1972, the alleged failure of presupposed conditions in
1974-1975, and the subsequent default on the contract.'9 Westinghouse
contended that the contract option to supply fuel to Turkey Point 4 bound
both parties only when FPL exercised the option in 1967, thus the transac-
tion clearly came under the terms of section 672.615. °
The district court held that the UCC's impracticability provisions were
inapplicable to both the 1965 contract and the option exercised in 1967,
reasoning that both the contract and the option were binding on the parties
at the time the 1965 contract was signed. 2' Further, the district court
concluded that the collapse of the uranium market, the selection of the fuel
purchase arrangement, and the resulting breach of the contract were not
"events" within the meaning of the statute.2 2 In rejecting the section
672.615 defenses, the district court, in effect, refused to allow Westing-
13 579 F.2d at 858.
1 See note 6 supra.
" 579 F.2d at 858.
' Id. Orders otherwise not appealable may be appealed if the order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. The district
judge must so state in writing and the Court of Appeals must grant permission for the appeal.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1966).
I7 See note 11 supra. See generally Joskow, supra note 8, at 164-71.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.101(1) (West 1966).
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house to benefit from a statute which was enacted after the date of the
contract. The trial court's decision not to apply the Code retroactively is
consistent with case law deciding similar issues.2
On appeal, Westinghouse urged the Fourth Circuit to apply the UCC's
provisions to both fuel contracts. 2 Accepting this view in part, the Fourth
Circuit applied the Code to the contract created in 1967 when FPL exer-
cised its option to purchase uranium for Turkey Point 4. The court found,
however, that the Code did not govern the original contract made in 1965,
and affirmed the district court's decision. 25 The Fourth Circuit first exam-
ined the mechanics of an option contract. The court reasoned that an
option contract potentially entails two contracts. The first contract is an
agreement to keep an offer open, while the second contract emerges upon
the exercise of that option.2 1 Under this reasoning, the exercise of the
option binds both parties to the resulting contract. The Fourth Circuit
noted that Florida courts have accepted this traditional analysis. 2 There-
fore, the second contract was created after the effective date of the Code
when FPL exercised its option. Consequently, the Court applied the Code
to the Turkey Point 4 transaction.28
Regarding the 1965 Turkey Point 3 contract, the court stated that the
Code's applicability depended upon the meaning given "events" as used
in the transition provision of the Florida statute.29 Although Florida courts
had not addressed the issue prior to the Westinghouse case, other courts
generally have construed corresponding transition provisions to bar the
application of the Code to pre-Code transactions." The court distinguished
2 See note 30 infra.
24 579 F.2d at 859.
Id. at 859-63.
Id. at 859. Cf. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Profitt, 329 Pa. 316, 319, 198 A. 56, 57
(1938) (option is a contract to keep an offer open, contemplating contract of sale); 1 S.
WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 61d (3d ed. 1957) (terms of option must be accepted in order to form
contract binding on both parties); 11 Williston, supra § 1441 (3d ed. 1957) (in option contract,
when offer is accepted, a new contract arises, and may be specifically enforced). In Heller v.
Pope, 250 N.Y. 132, 164 N.E. 881 (1928), the court dismissed an action for breach of contract
on the grounds that the language "for this option you agree to. . ." made the agreement an
option, not a contract binding on both parties. Id. at 135, 164 N.E. at 882. The court said
"[a] binding option is a contract, but it is also an offer which, when accepted, will create
another contract." Id.; accord, Lilleback v. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co., 120 Fla. 289, 162 So. 866,
867 (1935); Acheson v. Smiths, Inc., 110 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576, 577 (1933).
2 579 F.2d at 859, citing South Inv. Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1952); Frissell
v. Nichols, 94 Fla. 403, 114 So. 431, 433 (1927); Goodman v. Goodman, 290 So.2d 552, 555
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
21 579 F.2d at 859. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Westinghouse followed prior Florida
case law. See, e.g., Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1954) (laws existing at
time and place of execution of contract which affect its discharge and enforcement are consid-
ered an express part of the contract).
" 579 F.2d at 860. To support the Code's applicability to the FPL contracts, Westing-
house relied on language in the Florida UCC applying the Code to "events" occurring after
the Code's effective date. See note 3 supra.
11 579 F.2d at 860. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Valdak
Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972), is typical of the general refusal to apply the UCC
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several cases which have applied the Code retroactively, reasoning that
they addressed procedural and remedial issues rather than the Code's
substantive provisions..3' Since the application of the-Code's commercial
impracticability provisions would have drastically altered the substantive
rights of the parties, the Fourth Circuit followed the majority rule3 2 deny-
ing retroactive application of substantive provisions.
33
The Fourth Circuit rejected Westinghouse's argument that the election
of the fuel service plan in 1972 and the failure of the presupposed condition
of the uranium market were relevent "events" under section 680.101(1).
The court determined that FPL, in choosing its supply arrangement in
1972, merely acted pursuant to the terms of the 1965 pre-Code fuel con-
tract.- Since FPL could not have rejected all of the proposed alternative
plans, 38 the agreement was not an option but a sales contract which bound
both parties from its inception.3 7 With regard to changes in presupposed
conditions, the court found that the law of excuse involved adjudicating
the rights and duties of the parties. 31 Since the rights and duties set forth
retroactively. In Empire Life, a post-Code foreclosure occurred pursuant to the terms of a pre-
Code security agreement. Id. at 332-33. The trial court evaluated the foreclosure according
to UCC provisions. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court after noting that the over-
whelming majority of cases considering the retroactivity.of the Code had applied the pre-Code
law to all transactions entered into before the effective date of the Code. Id. at 33. See also
Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1967), In re Kokomo Times Pub. and Printing
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Rinnert v. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp., 74
Ill. App. 2d 388, 220 N.E. 2d 256, 258 (1966). In a case presenting a similar issue, the federal
district court in Michigan reasoned that,
[W]hile the word 'event' is not defined in the code it is inconceivable that any duty
imposed by pre-Code law which may have to be performed after the effective date
of the code is an event contemplated by MSA §19.9991 [identical to § 680.101(1)].
If it were, then every pre-Code transaction which had not been 'terminated, com-
pleted, consummated or enforced' prior to the effective date of the code would be
governed by the code. The language of the code does not suggest such a result ....
In re Armor Indus., Inc., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1049, 1052 (S.D. Mich. 1968) (footnote omitted).
See also Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1967).
' 579 F.2d at 861. The Fourth Circuit had previously applied the UCC to pre-Code
transactions. In Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 415 F.2d 875, 877
(4th Cir. 1969), the Fourth Circuit held that South Carolina's long-arm statute, enacted as
part of the UCC, permits jurisdiction over one who breaches a pre-Code contract. The court
emphasized, however, that the legislature intended merely to expand the state's jurisdiction
and not alter substantive rights of commercial parties. Id. See also United Sec. Corp. v.
Bruton, 213 A.2d 892, 893-94 (D.C. 1965) (UCC burden of proof standard required in post-
Code trial concerning pre-Code transaction); Ohio Brass Co. v. Allied Prod. Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 417, 419-20 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (UCC statute of limitations applied to pre-Code con-
tract); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copely, 213 Va. 449, 451, 192 S.E. 2d 735, 736 (1972)
(UCC applicable to suit involving an obligation arising after enactment of the Code).
u 579 F.2d at 860-62; see note 38 infra.
3 579 F.2d at 860-63.
u Id. at 859.
13 Id. at 863.
" See note 9 supra.
" See notes 27-29 supra.
3 The rationale behind the general refusal to apply substantive provisions retroactively
is that the parties to a contract should know for planning purposes what rules of law apply
1979]
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in the contract were determined under pre-Code law, Westinghouse could
not rely on a subsequently enacted Code provision to excuse its perform-
ance. 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the first contract estab-
lished an obligation on the part of both Westinghouse and FPL to sell and
purchase fuel for Turkey Point 3, effective in 1965,1o and that this contract
must be governed by the pre-Code law of excuse.4'
Allowing a pre-Code contract to be governed by the provisions of the
UCC could subject many pre-Code agreements to substantive changes in
the midst of the performace of the contract. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that such a result was not intended by the Code's draftsmen."2 The intent
of section 680.101(1) becomes clear when read in conjunction with subsec-
tion (2).11 These provisions require that the law in effect at the time the
transaction is entered into will control that transaction; the Code's provi-
sions will, therefore, apply to all transactions entered into after its effec-
tive date.4 To allow any duty imposed by a pre-Code contract to be gov-
erned by the Code simply because it must be performed after the adoption
of the Code would directly contravene the intent behind section 680.101
(2).1r The Fourth Circuit's reading of Florida's transition clause insures
that laws passed subsequent to the establishment of contractual obliga-
to the contract. For example, if the parties leave out a time of delivery provision on the
assumption that the present law implies a "reasonable time," it would be unfair to use a
different rule on delivery if a change in law occurs before the contract is completed. The point
is that the parties plan on the basis of substantive law existing at the time of the contract.
The law of excuse, however, by its very nature, applies only where conditions which the
parties had expected to remain constant have changed. Arguably, if Westinghouse or FPL
had thought that conditions might change, rendering delivery of the uranium impossible, the
companies would have insisted on special terms in the contracts. Thus, since parties do not
plan with respect to factors which will excuse performance, the rationale behind the refusal
to apply substantive law retroactively does not affect the impracticability provision. Section
672.615, therefore, appears to act as a remedial provision, applying a form of equitable relief.
The section appears to be a seller's analog to the buyer's consequential damages, providing
partial compensation to the seller. Procedural and remedial aspects of the Code are generally
applied retroactively. See text accompanying note 31 supra. Consequently, if the excuse of
commercial impracticability is remedial, that section of the Code may be applied to contracts
negotiated prior to the Code's enactment. No direct authority exists for this particular avenue
of thought, but it is currently under study. Conversation with Andrew McThenia, Professor
of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law, at Washington & Lee (Jan. 29, 1979).
For commentary suggesting the remedial aspect of the excuse of commercial impracticability,
see Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Roadmap For Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 243 n.128 (1963); Posner
& Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
6 J. LEGAL STUn. 83, 112-18 (1977).
579 F.2d at 863.
dO Id. at 858.
, Id. at 862-63.
42 Id. at 862.
s FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.101(1) (West 1966).
" See Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1967); In re Armor Ind., 5 U.C.C.
REP. SEnv. 1049, 1052 (S.D. Mich. 1968).
"1 See 5 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 1052.
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tions are not applicable to the performance of those obligations." To have
held otherwise would have required contracting parties to risk changes in
the applicable law before the expiration of the contract.'7
The Fourth Circuit's decision against retroactive application of subse-
quent legislation is consistent with Florida case law." Absent a specifically
enunicated intent to apply a law retroactively, Florida law will have pro-
spective effect only." Furthermore, the section 680.101 transition clause
also indicates that the Code was not intended to operate retroactively.5 '
Otherwise, that section would be surplusage. Clearly, the Fourth Circuit's
decision adheres to the intent of the Code's draftsmen.
Read narrowly, the Westinghouse court's decision simply bars the ap-
plication of the UCC to contracts made prior to the Code's effective date.
Consequently, parties to pre-Code option contracts benefit from the cer-
tainty regarding which law will govern when the option is exercised. Simi-
larly, parties to pre-Code contracts are assured that the law in effect at the
time a contract was created will continue to govern their agreement.'
Broader reading of the decision indicates further support in the Fourth
Circuit for the general rule against the retroactive application of any law
to substantive issues.12 Such a strengthening of the rule against the retroac-
tive application of laws provides certainty of interpretation for those par-
ties entering long-term contracts. Thus, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that
since long-term contracts necessarily impose long-term obligations, the
parties should know at the outset exactly how those obligations will be
construed and what the ramifications ensuing from failure to perform them
will be."
B. Class Action Damages Under the Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act (the Act),I enacted in 1968, requires a "price
tag" on credit2 enabling consumers to determine the cost of borrowing
46 Brief of Appellee, supra note 7, at 12.
4 Id.
See Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So.2d 521, 524-25 (Fla.
1973); Springer v. Colburn, 162 So.2d 513, 515.16 (Fla. 1964); Imperial Point Colonnades
Condominium, Inc. v. Freedom Prop. Int'l, Inc., 349 So.2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
11 Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So.2d 521, 524-25 (Fla. 1973).
10 See note 3 supra.
" See Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1967).
52 See United Sec. Corp. v. Bruton, 213 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1965); text accompanying notes
35-36 supra.
1 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 7, at 11-12.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976). The Truth in Lending Act is the name commonly used
to denote Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
2 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESMENT OF THE UNTED STATES, AMERICAN CONSUMER PROTECTION,
H.R. Doc. No. 57, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). President Johnson recommended the Truth
in Lending Act as "a price tag that will tell a consumer the percentage rate per year that is
1979]
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funds.' Prior to the Act, the myriad of credit disclosure practices4 did not
adequately enable the average consumer to determine the cost of deferred
payment or to compare available credit plans.' By requiring a clear and
complete disclosure of credit terms, the Act established a means of com-
paring credit costs without regulating the credit industry per se.1 Through
comprehensive regulations,7 the Act provides for a uniform method of stat-
ing finance charges8 and annual percentage rates9 in language understand-
able to consumers.'" The regulations detail the manner of disclosing credit
terms without dictating the conditions under which credit may be ex-
tended."
The Act is enforced by criminal penalties,'2 as well as administrative'
3
and civil remedies.'4 Federal class action suits brought under the Act have
being charged for his borrowing." Id. The ordinary consumer has the right to know exactly
how much he pays for credit in order to shop wisely for the best credit bargain. Id.
I Id. The Act covers loans made to consumers, as well as credit and deferred payment
sales, when made in the ordinary course of business. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1976); see W.
WILLIER & F. HART, CONSUMER CREDIT HANDBOOK 92 B.03[1]-[3] (1969).
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1962, 1970 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT 1040]. The existing disclosure
practices included "add on" rates which, in contrast to the declining balance method, had
the effect of understating the annual rate by approximately 50 percent. Furthermore, credit
unions and small loan companies charged a flat monthly rate, while many creditors added
additional fees to the quoted charges. Other segments of the credit industry failed to disclose
any rates. Congress realized that "no one segment of the industry feels it can afford to reform
itself by disclosing the annual percentage rate without incurring a competitive disadvan-
tage." Id. Thus, Congress passed the Act to require that all creditors use the same method
in computing and disclosing finance charges.
HOUSE REPORT 1040 at 7, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1963.
Id. Uniform disclosure methods would enable consumers to compare credit costs with-
out additional calculations. Id. at 1970-71.
7 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.8 (1978). The Act authorized the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to draft regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1604
(1976). The regulations promulgated are set out in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.8 (1978).
See generally Schober, Truth in Lending: Analysis of Act and Regulation Z, 4 REAL PROP.,
PROB. AND TRUST J. 305 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schober].
15 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). A finance charge is defined as "the sum of all charges, payable
directly or indirectly by the person to whom credit is extended, and imposed directly or
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit." Id. § 1605(a). Included
within this definition are interest, service charges, loan fees, and premiums or charges for
insurance against credit loss. Id.
I Id. § 1606. The annual percentage rate is determined according to the actuarial method
in the extension of credit other than on an open end credit plan. Id. § 1606(a)(1). Under an
open end credit plan, the annual percentage rate is the total finance charge for the period,
divided by the amount upon which the finance charge for that period is based, multiplied by
the number of such periods in a year. Id. § 1606(a)(2).
,0 See Schober, supra note 7, at 305.
" HOUSE REPORT 1040 at 1, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1975.
Regulation Z details the uniform method of disclosure required by each segment of'the credit
industry. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.8 (1978).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976). Maximum criminal liability is $5,000 in fines or one year in
prison, or both. Id.
,3 Id. § 1607.
" Id. § 1640. For individual claims, the minimum recovery is $100 and the maximum is
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engendered substantial controversy. 5 Although this procedure was not spe-
cifically provided for under the Act, plaintiffs bringing class actions ad-
vanced the traditional bases for such actions, particularly stressing the
high costs of litigating individual claims involving smaller damage
amounts.'" Creditors, however, voiced strong objections to the large money
judgments subsequently awarded'7 by granting each class member'6 the
$100 minimum recovery permitted by the Act.'6 In cases involving large
$1,000. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i).
" Plaintiffs combined the federal class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with the individual damage awards under the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640 (1976), to bring
class actions for Truth in Lending violations. Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1410-12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Class Actions]. Initially, the
Truth in Lending Act appeared to be well-suited for class actions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, combined with the individual damage award under the Act, provided large
groups of consumers easy access to the courts to redress wrongs inflicted by creditors. See
Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed Alternatives,
27 STAN. L. REv. 101, 101-07 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]. Since the
major objective of Rule 23(b)(3) was to economize time, effort and expense in litigation, the
class action -seemed to provide a superior method of bringing Truth in Lending claims.
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts
(adopted by the Supreme Court on Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966), 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-
03 (1966). However, class actions under the Act quickly lost judicial favor due to the high
potential damage awards. See Class Actions, supra at 1411-12.
" See Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 107-09. Small claimants, whose awards
might be no greater than the $100 statutory minimum, often found court costs and attorneys'
fees far greater than the damages awarded. Dividing litigation costs among a large number
of claimants provided small claimants their day in court. Class actions were, therefore, the
only means of redress for many consumers. See Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 633, 663-64 (1970); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 501, 504-08 (1969).
" See Class Actions, supra note 15, at 1411-12. When a number of classes filed suit
seeking damages great enough to bankrupt creditors, the courts exhibited a great reluctance
to certify plaintiff classes. Comment, Truth in Lending and the Federal Class Action, 22 VML.
L. Rsv. 418, 423-24 (1977); see, e.g., Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (potential damages of $8 billion); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,
54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (potential damages of $13 million); Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil
Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (potential damages of $68 million); Gerlach v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (potential damages of $1 billion).
Prior to Ratner, federal courts generally had favored certification of class actions. Class
Actions, supra note 15, at 1412. The Ratner class included 130,000 claimants, which repre-
sented potential damages of $13 million. 54 F.R.D. at 413. The Ratner court refused to certify
the Ratner class on the ground that a class action was not superior to other methods of
adjudication as required under Rule 23 because the proposed recovery far exceeded actual
damages caused by the violation. Id. at 415-16. Subsequent to Ratner, courts have refused to
certify class actions, interpreting Ratner to say that Congress intended to preclude class
actions under the Act. Class Actions, supra note 15, at 1415; see, e.g., Haynes v. Logan Furn.
Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974); Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CONS. CRED.
GumE (CCH) 98,640 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Contra, Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 71 F.R.D. 334 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (refusing to
follow Ratner, certified a class of 95,000).
, See Class Actions, supra note 15, at 1411-12.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
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classes, few creditors could absorb the resulting damages, which often
amounted to millions of dollars."0 While amending the Act in 1974 specifi-
cally to authorize class actions," Congress responded to the creditors'
objections by limiting the awards in such suits to the lesser of $100,000 or
one percent of the creditor's net worth, plus actual damages.2 The Amend-
ment enumerated several factors to guide the courts in assessing damages,
including the amount of actual damages, the financial resources of the
creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which
the violation was intentional.? Although the amendment clarified the use
of class actions under the Act, the recent Fourth Circuit opinion in Barber
v. Kimbrell's, Inc.24 indicates that some problems remain unsolved.
In Barber, a furniture store customer instituted a class action against
Kimbrell's, Inc. and its parent company, Furniture Distributors, Inc., for
violations of the Truth in Lending Act.? Plaintiff had purchased furniture
on an installment plan under which the price was added to a balance owed
from a previous purchase. Barber's suit alleged that the written agreement
inadequately disclosed pertinent credit information and, therefore, vio-
lated the Truth in Lending Act. " The alleged violations included using
misleading terminology, obscuring pertinent information with unnecessary
language, failing to itemize finance charges, and not listing the required
information in a meaningful manner.? The district court granted summary
judgment for plaintiff on the liability issue and awarded the maximum
statutory damages, in addition to attorneys' fees of $25,000.?
In evaluating plaintiff's Truth in Lending claim, the district court first
examined whether Kimbrell's and its parent company, Furniture Distribu-
tors, were creditors under the Act.29 The Act defines creditors as those
"who regularly extend or arrange for the extension of credit."" Kimbrell's,
by its own admission, was a creditor regularly extending credit to its retail
customers.3' Furniture Distributors argued, however, that it had no direct
credit involvement with the plaintiff, and, therefore, could not be deemed
a creditor. The district court disagreed, concluding that Furniture Distrib-
utors constituted a creditor under the Act because of its control over the
21 See Class Actions, supra note 15, at 1411.
1, Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1518 (1974)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976)).
u 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976).
,1 Id. § 1640(a).
24 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 329 (1978).
,1 Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 42, 43 (W.D.N.C. 1976). Plaintiff originally
filed a private action against Kimbrell's. She later amended her complaint in order to main-
tain a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Her complaint
was further amended to include the parent company, Furniture Distributors, as a defendant.
Id.
,' See id. at 47.
" Id. at 47-50; see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6, .8 (1978).
' 424 F. Supp. at 52.
21 Id. at 46.
30 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1976); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1978).
3, 424 F. Supp. at 46.
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subsidiary's credit extension, the joint corporate officers of Furniture Dis-
tributors and Kimbrell's, and the parent's receipt of all credit sale con-
tracts made by its subsidiaries.2 Kimbrell's and its parent company,
therefore, could be held jointly liable for violations of the Act.n Agreeing
with plaintiff's contentions, the court found the defendants liable for four
Truth in Lending violations."
Having determined the defendants' liability, the district court consid-
ered the factors relevant to the damage award." At the outset, the court
noted the absence of actual damages sustained by the class. The persis-
tency and frequency of the violations, as well as the intentional use of the
noncomplying contract and large resources of the creditors, however, led
to the assessment of maximum statutory damages.36 The trial judge ascer-
tained that one percent of Furniture Distributors' net worth exceeded
$100,000 and awarded the plaintiff class $100,000. 31 Without presenting
any findings of fact, the court also granted the class $25,000 in attorneys'
fees.3"
On appeal, the defendants asserted that the district court had erred in
its conclusions as to both liability and damage amount." While affirming
the finding of liability, the Fourth Circuit concluded that damages had
been assessed incorrectly." The court determined that the district court's
consideration of the parent's net worth in fixing statutory damages "upset
the balance struck by Congress."'" The Barber court reasoned that, since
the plaintiff class consisted of persons who dealt at only one Kimbrell's
store, that store's assets alone should determine the damage award.2 Con-
sidering the potentially exorbitant recoveries which would result if Furni-
ture Distributors' net worth were used in computing damages in each case
involving one of its subsidiaries, the majority concluded that Congress
could not have contemplated such large recoveries, particularly absent any
n Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
3, 424 F. Supp. at 47-50.
33 Id. at 51-52; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976); see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
424 F. Supp. at 51-52.
3 Id.
n Plaintiff's counsel sought only $19,955 in attorneys' fees, but the district court found
$25,000 to be "a reasonable sum under the circumstances." Id. at 52.
577 F.2d at 220-24. In addition to liability and damages, the defendants also claimed
errors as to the absence of findings to support the award of attorneys' fees and the denial of
request for a jury trial. Id. at 224-26. On the issue of attorneys' fees, the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded for further findings to support the amount awarded. Id. at 226. The
court analyzed the jury trial issue on constitutional grounds, reasoning that the rights and
duties created by the Act were analogous to the common law tort duty not to misrepresent
and that the relief sought by the plaintiff was legal rather than equitable. Therefore, a jury
trial was ordered for determining damages on remand. Id. at 224-25; see Curtis v. Loaether,
415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977), affl'd, 434 U.S.
575, 584-85 (1978); Mosley v. National Fin. Co., 440 F. Supp. 621 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
1' 577 F.2d at 218.
"1 Id. at 223.
42 Id.
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actual damages.43 Believing that Congress intended to limit liability to one
percent of the net worth of a single creditor, the Fourth Circuit remanded
for a redetermination of damages based on Kimbrell's individual worth.',
The computation of damages under the Truth in Lending Act is keyed
to the assets of the offending creditor." The Fourth Circuit's disagreement
with the district court in Barber presents a fundamental question of statu-
tory interpretation. Like Furniture Distributors, many creditors operate
through a parent-subsidiary relationship, with the parent company domi-
nating the credit plans and form contracts used by the subsidiary." Such
control renders the parent corporation jointly liable with the subsidiary for
violations of the Act.4" The statute and the legislative history, however,
provide little guidance on the resolution of the definitional conflict over
whose assets determine the damage award. 8
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Barber favors certain "creditors" in
suits involving Truth in Lending violations. By focusing on the class certi-
fied and the subsidiary's asset-base rather than the asset-base of the par-
ent and subsidiary, 9 the court ignored the one-sided nature of the Furni-
ture Distributors-Kimbrell's relationship. While recognizing the frequent
and intentional violations by both parent and subsidiary, the court refused
to impose damages corresponding to the parent's net worth. Instead, the
Barber court considered only Kimbrell's assets in determining damages for
violations for which Furniture Distributors was at fault.50 Essentially, the
court keyed the damages to the class involved, the purchasers from Kim-
brell's, rather than to the character of the offending creditor, as the Act
seems to require. The Act, however, imposes damages against any creditor
in violation of the Act and bases damages on the assets of that offending
creditor.' Absent any special provision for violations involving a parent-
subsidiary relationship, the Act indicates that the assets of each offending
creditor should be considered.52 Since Furniture Distributors' net worth
11 Id. at 223-24.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
" See, e.g., Clausen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 423 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
defendants in Clausen were a parent company and its subsidiary. Like Barber, the plaintiff
class proved no actual damages. However, in Clausen, the court considered the parent com-
pany's net worth in evaluating damages against both parent and subsidiary. Id. at 989-90.
Noting its disagreement, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Clausen in a footnote. 577 F.2d at 223
n.19.
4, Id. at 220-21.
11 Several commentators noted Congress' failure to specify whose net worth to consider
in cases involving joint liability of a parent and its subsidiary. See Davenport, Bank Class
Action Defenses: The Taming of the Truth in Lending Tiger, 92 BANKING L.J. 847, 863-64
(1975); Evans, Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, 29 PERS. FIN. L.Q. 9, 13 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Evans].
" See 577 F.2d at 223 n.20.
Id. at 223; see text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976).
52 In considering the assets of both parent and subsidiary, the resulting damage award
must still be within the statutory maximum. Id.
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